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The Young Lawyers:
Bane or Boon? 3
An after-dinner speech should, I am sure, besoothing to the digestion even when, as usual,
it fails to stimulate the cerebrum. I am afraid I may
be about to defy that cardinal principle. I want to
indulge for a few minutes in what may well be con­
sidered a kind of viewing with alarm. I hope you
will find, however, that it is offered in a buffered
form, and that any excess acid will be neutralized.
The law schools, as almost everyone knows, are
faced these days with an unprecedented wave of
new aspirants to the legal profession. My purpose
is not to try to explain this phenomenon but to con­
sider how we should greet it, and, more particularly,
to respond to what seem to me some regrettable mis­
givings being manifested by segments of the bar.
Unless I read the signs incorrectly, there is a grow­
ing sense of concern that the legal profession has
been oversold to the oncoming generation and that
in ways not yet clearly apparent we will soon have
Cause to regret it.
My suggestion is that such a pessimism would be­
tray the faith we should have in the law and our
profession, and may distract us from making the
most of our opportunities. In short, I view with
alarm those who would view with alarm.
Of course my own fears may be exaggerated; the
attitude I perceive may be nonexistent. If so, I hope
You will be indulgent, and remember that one of the
Talk delivered by Phil C. Neal, Dean of The Univer-
8ity of Chicago Law School, at the Annual Dinner
of The University of Chicago Law School Alumni
A.ssociation on May 11, 1972.
Phil C. Neal
time-honored and not least worthy devices of a law
professor is setting up and demolishing straw men.
But I think you will not consider the Chief Justice
of the United States a straw man. In a widely no­
ticed interview some months ago, noticed especially
by law students, he expressed «an uneasy feeling"
that the dramatic growth in law school enrollments
«may be another one of the situations in this era that
we are living in of creating expectations that are
beyond fulfillment." A report emanating from the
mid-winter meetings of the American Bar Associa­
tion-dare I call it another straw in the wind?-refers
to fears among leaders of the bar that the profession
will be torn by controversy over whether to limit the
number of young people permitted to become law­
yers. We are invited to consider the prospect that
thousands of disappointed young people, trained in
the skills of lawyers and unable to find work, may
turn against the system. In response to such con­
cerns the American Bar Association has created a
special nine-member Task Force to propose a pro­
gram for finding jobs for young lawyers. More re­
cently, we have had a report from another special
committee of the Bar Association to study the pos­
sible impact of the new wave of lawyers on the
standards of professional conduct. Among its sug­
gestions is a search for novel ways of screening law
students as to their character and moral fitness.
These expressions are not necessarily ominous.
They have been properly accompanied by affirma­
tions of the bar's commitment to an open profession,
and they point to some problems that are surely
worthy of study. The Task Force on Lawyer Uti-
4 lization in particular has highly constructive possi­
bilities. But at the same time there is surely some
paradox here. The theme of countless Law Day
speeches of recent memory was encouragement to
the young to abandon self-help, to move their dis­
contents from the streets to the orderly processes of
.
society, and to look to law for change and improve­
ment. Perhaps they have misread the message. Per­
haps, even, they have not been much influenced by
it, for certainly other and quite different forces have
had their part in stimulating applications to law
school. But it would be surprising if there were not
a good many who thought they could detect a con­
siderable change in tune from the themes of only
two or three years ago.
The apprehensions about the new generation of
lawyers seem to be stirred by two different but re­
lated causes.
First, there is the simple matter of numbers.
There are about 95,000 students in law schools this
year. The number of lawyers presently engaged in
practice, either private or governmental, is reported
as 325,000. The specter that is seen is of a bar that
will suddenly find itself with four lawyers for every
three now active. The specter is of course exagger­
ated, if past experience is a guide. In 1950, for ex­
ample, there were 53,000 students in law school as
compared with about 200,000 lawyers in practice.
Yet from 1951 to 1954 the number of lawyers rose
by only about 17,000. For two decades the enroll­
ment in law schools has been rising, although at an
accelerated rate in the last two years. In the same
period the number of new admissions to the bar has
paralleled quite steadily the number of third-year
students. For the country as a whole, the number of
third-year students has regularly been far lower than
the number of first-year students, and in recent years
has fallen to about one-half. In the current year
there are about 22,000 third-year students in ap­
proved law schools, a slight rise in the proportion of
third- to first-year students, who this year numbered
36,000. If all of the present third-year students are
admitted to the bar the increase in the lawyer popu­
lation will be about seven per cent, a substantial in­
crease but hardly a deluge. For the past fifteen
years the growth rate has averaged about three per
cent a year.
Can the society absorb lawyers in such numbers?
From an economic point of view, the answer is clear.
Of course it can, although perhaps at a reduced rate
of return, either for the new lawyers or for old law­
yers or for some mix of both. And such a lower rate
of return, should it occur, will of course have its im­
pact on the new enrollments of law students. The
supply of lawyers is not immune from the laws that
govern the supply of pork.
But the more interesting question is not the eco­
nomic but- the social one. Are we on the verge of
having too many lawyers for the good of society?
Are we really worried about whether there is useful
work to do for all who can be induced to join? The
answer we give will say much about our self-esteem
and our perception of the role of lawyers in the
national life.
Television has helped glamorize somewhat, for
the moment, the public image of the lawyer. But
when this season's attractions have lost their ratings
lawyers will be left with their traditional burden of
a layman's view of them that does not fully under­
stand, that depreciates, and that is often impatient
with their role. It has always been easy to stir anti­
pathy for the vision of a lawyer-ridden society. Per­
haps that is the vision many would see in the fact
that the lawyer-population has increased much more
rapidly than the population as a whole during the
last two decades. A more sober and perceptive
view, which should come most naturally to lawyers,
would understand this trend to be an inevitable
product of our changing society: on the one hand,
a reflection and not a cause of the increasing com­
plexity of social organization; and on the other, an
index of our rising social wealth and its ability to
provide a quality of life that includes more help
from the legal profession.
It is this last aspect that especially needs emphasis
now. Abundant needs and opportunities for the
wise use of lawyers' talents confront us. There is
scarcely an area of social concern in which, could
we afford them, an infusion of legal resources might
not make a difference. The most conspicuous pres­
ent example is the criminal justice system, that as­
pect of law that touches the most elemental of social
needs and the most acute of human plights. What
would it do for the performance of those institutions
if every major police department had a skilled legal
staff, if corrections administrators had lawyers at
their elbows, if our prosecutors' offices could deal
with cases rather than with numbers, if we had
public-defender establishments equivalent in re­
sources and efficiency to large private law offices?
How shall we manage the new burdens of criminal
defense that are sooner or later-and probably very
soon-to be imposed by a constitutional rule requir­
ing counsel for indigents in misdemeanor cases?
And what of the next development after that, which
seems likely to make the right to counsel even in
civil cases an expanding benefit in our society?
But these present and impending necessities can
hardly exhaust the field of good that lawyers could
do if given the opportunity. The present administra­
tion of the State of Illinois, if I judge by the number
of our own outstanding graduates who have been
attracted to it, has shown what opportunities there
are for the effective use of additional legal talent.
It seems unlikely that there is any agency of state
or local government that could not gain from the
addition of able lawyers. Our legislative processes
from the bottom to the top, and the executive offices
that feed legislation into them, could be far more
professional and technically competent than they
are. We need legal skills at least as much for the
making of good laws as for the repair business that
comes from defective ones. And all of this says
nothing about the countless individuals who from
time to time might cope better with the world had
they the helping hand of a sympathetic lawyer.
Apart from the mere question of numbers, there
appears to be a concern that the new generation of
lawyers may be a disillusioned or frustrated group,
and perhaps even cantankerous-as if that would be
a mutation in lawyers! The new students do seem
to come with different and perhaps more idealistic
motivations than those of a decade or a generation
ago. There seems more zeal to take part in solving
social problems, a tendency to identify with causes
or goals, a stronger sense of commitment to par­
ticular kinds of careers. Perhaps also there is a
stronger conviction about the humanitarian potential
of the lawyer's career, and an urge to perform in
that role, even at some economic sacrifice. Certainly
there is a rising interest in the arts of litigation and­
the uses to which they may be put.
It is hard to see legitimate grounds for anxiety in
these qualities or attitudes. Perhaps the fear is that
an army of such lawyers will reinforce pressures
that are already straining our processes and unset­
tling many time-sanctioned legal principles. The
new openness of the law to untraditional claims; the
recognition of group interest through judicial and
not merely legislative action; the proliferation of the
class action; the assumption by judges of increas­
ingly managerial and directing, powers-all these
raise difficult and even profound questions about the
modes through which official processes can best
mediate the claims upon our society. But these are
questions about the content and processes of law,
not about the value of lawyers.. It would be error
to wish the claims to fail for lack of lawyers to ad­
vance them. It is the business of the legal system
to attract and channel the interests that press for
satisfaction, to shape the right processes for testing
them, and to effect a more stable and enduring res­
olution because the claims have been recognized
and weighed. Our attitude toward the youthful tide
of new lawyers puts to the test our faith in law itself.
It is also, I think, a test of the profession's belief
in education. Edward Levi has spoken eloquently of
the nature of law as a special commitment that
5
6 brings its own force and values to the vectors that
shape society-primarily neither an instrument of
change nor a bulwark against change, but a commit­
ment "to develop concepts, and to maintain and
operate procedures which enable a sovereign com­
munity to be governed by rule for the common
good ... and to make that rule effective." To im­
·part an understanding of that commitment, of its
strengths and its limitations, of its historical roots
and of the social and behavioral forces with which it
interacts, is a necessary function of legal education.
If lawyers carry a burden of inadequate appre­
ciation of their role by the society at large, law
schools perhaps carry the burden that lawyers do
not always seem fully to appreciate the values that
legal education should serve. It is often suggested
that law graduates might do as well to learn less in
school and leave more to learning on the job. To be
sure, not all law schools need be alike; there should
be room for experimentation, perhaps with two-year
law schools for some and with more limited kinds of
training for others that will prepare them for special
tasks in assisting lawyers-a need, incidentally, that
seems to refute the idea that we may be about to
have too many hands to do the work. But I trust
there will always be support and enthusiam for the
kind of education our own school has tried to give
and in which I think it has been a leader. I mean
an education that looks beyond the merely utili­
tarian or manipulative essentials of the lawyer's art
and invites a deeper understanding of the complex­
ities and variety of the law-an education concerned
with causes and effects, that searches for the values
law serves and the means by which they may be re­
alized, and that may lay a foundation for wisdom
as well as technique.
For such an education, the new students seem to
me at least as promising subjects as their predeces­
sors now at the bar. Let us look upon them as a re­
source and not a problem, and let us hope that
whatever visions of a rewarding life have brought




I am grateful to the Committee for its invitation toexpress my views on the proposed amendment
to the Constitution that is presented in Senate Joint
Resolution 106. With your permission, and in the
hope of saving time, I should like first to read a short
prepared statement and then to attempt to answer
such questions as you may propound to me.
The Resolution being considered here offers a
plan-reduction of judicial tenure to renewable
eight-year terms-that has a long lineage. Dissatis­
faction with particular or general federal judicial
actions has not infrequently resulted in Congres­
sional proposals to diminish judicial independence,
whether by reducing the term of office, by providing
less cumbersome methods of judicial removal, or by
changing the method of appointment. Indeed, the
essence of the present proposal maybe traced back
to no less an eminence than Thomas Jefferson.
Although Jefferson was, as revealed in Professor
Haynes's book, Selection and Tenure of Judges,
once committed to judicial independence, he later
changed his mind. His early position was encapsu­
lated in his own words in this way: "The judges ...
should not be dependent upon any man or body of
men. To these ends they should hold estates for life
in their offices, or, in other words, their commissions
should be during good behavior." After engaging
Statement by Philip B. Kurland, Professor of Law
at The University of Chicago Law School, to the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate of the
United States, May 19, 1972.
in battle with the Federalist judiciary led by John
Marshall, however, Jefferson came to the view, again
in his words: "A better remedy, I think, (than mak­
ing the Senate a Court of Appeal on constitutional
questions) would be to give future commissions to
judges for six years (the senatorial term) with re­
appointment by the president with the approbation
of both houses. If this should not be independent
enough, I know not what should be such, short of
the total irresponsibility under which they are acting
and serving now."
The proposal for fixed, renewable terms of judicial
office is not only ancient but contemporary. There
have been a plethora of such proposals since the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Edu­
cation. Thus, a quick glance at recent legislative
history reveals that in each of the 89th, 90th, 91st,
and 92nd Congresses there have been at least three
proposed constitutional amendments to the same
effect as S.J. Res. 106, although the proposed terms
varied from six years to ten years. (See, e.g., H.J.R.
1077, 1140; cf. H.R. 14183.) This scanty survey also
suggests that, with the exception of S.J. Res. 38,
offered in the first session of this Congress, and the
proposal before you, this form of restraint on the
federal judicial authority has usually originated in
the House of Representatives. It appears that, until
these hearings, none of these proposals has received
even committee consideration, no less the approba­
tion of either House.
I think it is evident why this proposition has not
met with success in the past and why it should not
meet with this Committee's approval now. There
are few propositions more likely to reduce the in-
8 dependence of the judiciary than to compel each
judge to account for his judgments periodically to
one part of what has been considered, until now, a
coordinate branch of government. History reveals
the grave constitutional defects that derive from a
judiciary subordinate to either the executive or the
legislature. The Declaration of Independence re­
cords as a grievance against King George III that:
"He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone,
for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and
payment of their salaries."
I commend to your attention on this subject all
of Hamilton's Federalist No. 78, but I shall quote
here just a few passages from it. He asserted that:
The complete independence of the courts of
justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Con­
stitution. By a limited Constitution, I under­
stand one which contains certain specified
exceptions to the legislative authority; such for
instance, as that it shall pass no bills of at­
tainder, no ex-past-facto laws, and the like.
Limitations of this kind can be preserved in
practice no other way than through the medium
of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenet
of the Constitution void. Without this, all the
reservations of particular rights or privileges
would amount to nothing. . . .
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the
rights of the Constitution, and of individuals,
which we perceive to be indispensable in the
courts of justice, can certainly not be expected
from judges who hold their offices by a tem­
porary commission. Periodical appointments,
however regulated, or by whomsoever made,
would, in some way or other, be fatal to their
necessary independence. If the power of mak­
ing them was committed either to the Executive
or legislature, there would be danger of an im­
proper complaisance to the branch which pos­
sessed it; if to both, there would be an unwill­
ingness to hazard the displeasure of either; if to
the people, or to persons chosen by them for the
special purpose, there would be too great a dis­
position to consult popularity, to justify a reli­
ance that nothing would be consulted but the
Constitution and the laws.
Certainly our history reflects an acceptance of
these arguments and a commitment to them. How­
ever distasteful the actions of the federal judiciary
may have been from time to time, the American
people, through their legislatures, have opposed any
incursions on that judicial independence that they
have regarded as essential to the concept of Amer­
ican constitutional democracy. Thus, the most pow­
erful leaders in our history have been thwarted in
their attempts to curb judicial independence. Jeffer­
son failed in his attempts to bring the judiciary to
heel; Jackson in his. The Radical leaders of the
Reconstruction Congress could not persuade of the
desirability of limiting the judicial power. And
Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Court-packing plan met
defeat in this very body.
In this era when government has, for better or
worse, entered into control of and participation in
so much of the lives of every American, the need
for an independent judiciary becomes greater not
less. It is in the judiciary that the individual and
the minority can sometimes find succor from im­
positions that no governmental agency should have
the right to impose. I do not mean by this, of course,
that the judiciary alone is capable of protecting our
liberties. But I do contend that it is only with the
participation of an independent judiciary that the
other branches of our government will assure the
rights of the individual against the behemoth of
government. An independent judiciary is a nec­
essary if not a sufficient condition of our liberty.
A renewable term, as proposed in S.J. Res. 106,
seems to me the most destructive of devices for lim­
iting the independence of judges. For, it must be
remembered, that such authority as the judicial
branch of our government may have, vis-a-vis other
branches of the government, is totally dependent on
the force of public opinion. And so, whether or not
judges would, under the proposed scheme, actually
make their decisions with a concern for legislative
approbation by way of reappointment, it is likely to
become true that the public would regard this as
the basis for their decision. Only if the purpose of
the proposal is further to sap the strength of the
judiciary should a renewable term be regarded as
desirable.
There is some experience with judicial terms re­
newable at the will of the legislature, although it is
remote. In 1951, judges of the German Constitu­
tional Court were given renewable eight-year terms,
renewable at the decision of the legislature. After
19 years of experience with this system, it was
abandoned in 1970 in favor of a fixed twelve-year
term.
A short, fixed, nonrenewable term, would make
more difficult the problem of securing men of ap­
propriate talents to undertake the job. But at least
those who did would not be performing it with the
knowledge that they would some day be account­
able to the political predilections of a majority of
the Senate for their continuance in office.
Indeed, I am of the view that we already have too
much of this problem by reason ot the fact that we
now permit "promotions" from within the federal
judicial system. For there are some lower court
judges who indulge their task with recognition that,
if they please the appointing powers, they may re­
ceive a new or better position. If I had my way, I
should provide that, in order to preserve the inde­
pendence of the federal judiciary, a federal judge
should be forever barred from any other post in na­
tional government, judicial or non-judicial, elected,
or appointive.
I am, I think, sufficiently on record to show that
I am not an unqualified admirer of the efforts of
the federal judiciary. I am, by study and experience,
committed to the desirability of and need for ju­
dicial restraint. But I am equally of the view that
that restraint must be self-imposed; that the im-
positions of external restraints such as those con­
tained in this Resolution would be far more disas­
trous in its effect than even the most headstrong
judiciary.
In fact, the existent deficiencies of the judiciary,
as I see them, are in no small measure attributable
to the failure of this body to exercise the discretion
9
continued on page 19
The Age of Antiquarius:
On Legal History
in a Time of Troubles
10
Grant Gilmore
During the greater part of the past hundredyears the American law schools enjoyed a
spectacular success. The students, the professors,
even the deans, shared a buoyant self-confidence, an
ebullient enthusiam, a pervasive intellectual and
spiritual euphoria. It is only during the past twenty
years or so that we have begun to doubt, to ques­
tion ourselves, to wonder whether, after all, we were
on the right track. The self-confidence of our pred­
ecessors has given way to a disquieting intellectual
disarray. Various proposals have been put forward
in the attempt to rekindle the enthusiasm of the past
in the service of new causes. One such proposal,
which has recently enlisted a considerable amount
of support, is that, abandoning the antihistorical bias
which has characterized most American legal writ­
ing in this century, we should, at long last, become
historians and turn our energies to the reconstruc­
tion of our long despised past. I should like to ex­
plore here some of the problems which the historical
approach to law-or anything else-poses in the de­
clining years of the twentieth century.
The legal profession in this country has always
taken pride in being up to the minute. This present­
mindedness has indeed been quite as apparent in
the law schools as in the market place. Our case
books must be revised every year or two, so that the
This p.aper was delivered by Grant Gilmore, The
Harry A. Bigelow Professor of Law at The Univer­
sity of Chicago, at the inaugural William Winslow
Crosskey Lecture in Legal History on May 4, 1972.
It is reprinted with the permission of The University
of Chicago Law Review from the Spring 1972 issue.
old cases can be weeded out and replaced by new
ones. Our treatises must receive annual infusions of
new blood; for the truth, the whole truth and noth­
ing but the truth, you must consult the Pocket Part.
Our course offerings must be realigned year by year
to reflect our current crises and concerns: how to
rebuild a city; how to clean up our sadly polluted
environment; how to make the poor people content
with their station in life.
Our present-mindedness has led us to hold juris­
prudential theory in low esteem. We have looked on
ourselves as problem solvers, not as system builders.
But lawyers can no more escape jurisprudence than
people can escape humanity. If we do not have one
system, we shall have another system; the one thing
we cannot conceive of is that there is no system.
Our pretense that we are all pragmatic anarchists
has never been more than skin deep.
I
We have, I suggest, been living for a long time­
too long a time-within the mainstream of nine­
teenth century thought. Our current malaise may
reflect the obscure realization that the nineteenth
century ended some time ago. Still, it was a great
century while it lasted and we may congratulate
ourselves on having been able to go on living in it
as long as we have. A review of some of the charac­
teristic features of nineteenth century theory will
help us understand both why the promise it held out
was a peculiarly attractive one to lawyers-practi­
tioners and academics alike-and why it has taken us
so long to break out of its magic spell.
To the nineteenth century mind it was self-evident
that the course of events was arranged in a develop­
mental sequence and was not a merely random
series of accidental happenings.' That was the com­
mon thread which ran through many celebrated
nineteenth century formulations in apparently di­
verse fields. From that basic assumption it naturally
followed that if we could catch hold of the process
which had been at work in any area of human en­
deavor or of the physical universe, we would already
know what the end result must be: the end is con­
tained in the beginning as the flower is contained in
the seed. Belief in the existence of some develop­
mental process usually went hand in hand with the
belief that . the process, at least in the long run,
was one of progressive improvement-toward some
vaguely conceived, perhaps distant, yet realizable
Utopia where clean-limbed men, beautiful women
and well-behaved children would live in peace and
abundance, devoting themselves to exercises of in­
tellectual exploration and spiritual contemplation. 2
Thus to Darwin came the hypothesis that the
process of natural selection was that of the survival
of the fittest. To Marx came the hypothesis that the
process of political organization was the successive
dominance of the several classes into which he found
society divided-from feudalism, to capitalism, to
communism. To Auguste Comte, the father of soci­
ology, the successive stages of human thought ran
in linear sequence from the theological through the
metaphysical to the scientific; in Comte's mind there
was no doubt that there was a clear gain as revela­
tion was succeeded by philosophical speculation and
speculation by empirical knowledge.' To Herbert
Spencer-whose Social Statics, we once had to be
reminded, were not written into the fourteenth
amendment'<it was clear that the law of develop­
ment was "an advance from homogeneity of struc­
ture to heterogeneity of structure."
[T]his law of organic progress [he wrote] is
the law of all progress. Whether it be in the
development of the Earth, in the development
of Life upon its surface, in the development of
Society, of Government, of Manufacturers, of
Commerce, of Language, Literature, Science,
Art, this same evolution of the simple into the
complex, through successive differentiations,
holds throughout."
The nineteenth century invented history, as it in­
vented so many other things. The nineteenth cen­
tury historian looked on himself as engaged in the
same line of work as other scientists and theorists­
his being different from theirs only in that the ma­
terials he worked with related to the past instead of
the present. But his function, like theirs, was to lay
bare the development sequence which would ex­
plain the progress of human society and thus reveal
the goal toward which it was headed. Most nine­
teenth century historians shared the pervasive Uto­
pianism of the time-which no doubt explains why
such an inordinate amount of time and energy was
spent in trying to account for the dissolution of the
Roman Empire and the regression of European so­
ciety for five hundred years into something like bar­
barism. Extraordinary ingenuity was lavished on
the demonstration that the Empire had not really
dissolved and that society had not really relapsed
into barbarism-at most there had been a few minor
setbacks and temporary reversals in the steady
march toward the good Iife.?
The various emerging disciplines, both in the nat­
ural sciences and in what were later called the social
sciences, were looked on as being merely so many
alternative routes toward the ultimate truth which
would some day be revealed-the ultimate truth
about man, about his society, about his environment,
about his universe. The philosopher, the scientist,
the economist, the sociologist, the historian were all
brothers-in-arms in the prosecution of this essen­
tially theological enterprise. And just as every river
must some time reach the sea, so their divergent
labors would some day all come together in the
final, stupefying revelation of all the truth about
everything.
The underlying hypothesis of nineteenth century
theory was that, once we had correctly identified the
relevant developmental process, we held not only
the explanation of why things are as they are but
also the key to unlock the future. In practice it
proved quite as impossible as ever to predict what
was going to happen next year or next decade or
next century. The past could be plausibly arranged
in sequence but what the next link in the chain was
going to be remained as unpredictable as ever. The
theorists, particularly those who concerned them­
selves with the organization of human society, seem
11
12 to have reacted instinctively to this uncomfortable
fact of life with the reassuring belief that the process
had almost come to its predetermined end, the goal
had been nearly reached. Utopia was just around
the corner if it was not already here and now. In­
deed anyone who had the good fortune to be born
into the late nineteenth century establishment in
Western Europe or England or the United States
might reasonably have felt that further progress was
unimaginable, just as a reversal of fortune-a decline
and fall-was inconceivable. Thus most nineteenth
century social theory, including nineteenth century
historical theory, seems to come implicitly to a dead
stop as of the date of publication. Just as the theo­
logians had concluded that the age of miracles was
over, so their successors concluded that the age of
mutations was over. The theorists, however ingen­
ious their reconstruction of the dynamism of the
past had been, ended by presenting us with a static
model which, it was assumed, would hold good for
all time to come. Even in the Marxist version there
was only one more revolution to look forward to.
History and the other social sciences became, we
might say, the continuation of theology by other
means.
II
In the history of American legal thought the half
century which preceded World War I was a period
of prodigious and unprecedented achievement. The
major categories into which we have subdivided our
legal systems were, one by one, reduced to order
and certainty in treatises which were as notable for
their intellectual excellence as they were for the un­
controlled exuberance .of their footnotes. We may
take the Restatements of the 1920s as the last gasp
of this explosion of intellectual energy.
All this literature was inspired by the nineteenth
century predisposition to believe that the age of
miracles and mutations was over. It was clear
enough that the common law had changed since its
emerge?ce in England after the Norman Conquest.
The early writs had given way to the forms of action
which had in turn been consigned to the grave, from
which, it may be, they still rule us. Equity had arisen
to supplement the common law and then to dis­
appear within it. Rules and doctrines had emerged,
flourished for a while and vanished. The law book
writers arranged the past in sequence and then, like
their counterparts in the social sciences, came to a
dead stop. In law, as elsewhere, we ended up with
a static model, assumed to be incapable of further
development or change. The one, true rule of law
having been discovered and proclaimed, there was
no need to give the matter further thought. By 1910
or 1920 we had apparently arrived at our legal
Utopia.
All this was carried out not in the name of history
but in the name of science. Dean Langdell of Har­
vard, who had as much as anyone to do with making
us what we have become, once remarked that «law is
a science" and that "all the available materials of
that science are contained in printed books."
[T]he library [he went on] is to us all that the
laboratories of the university are to the chemists
and physicists, all that the museum of natural
history is to the zoologists, all that the botanical
garden is to the botanists.'
Implicit in Langdell's analogy of law to the natural
sciences was the assumption that legal theorists,
like his chemists, physicists, zoologists and botanists,
were engaged in research designed to lead to the
progressive discovery and revelation of truth. The
essential quality of scientific truth, as the nineteenth
century saw it, was its immutability. From the same
cause the same effect must always follow. The con­
trolled experiment must always lead to the same re­
sult. Once the classification of animal life and plant
life has been completed, we know, for all time, what
the classification is. The legal scholar in his labo­
ratory, the library, was engaged in a comparable en­
deavor. The rules and doctrines which his patient
labors illuminated, the fundamental principles of the
common law which they illustrated, all shared the
immutability of scientific truth.
Langdellian jurisprudence led its adepts to the
conclusion that law is a neat and tidy structure of
interlocking logical propositions. Holmes began his
first lecture on the common law with the celebrated
epigram: "The life of the law has not been logic: it
has been experience."8 The flashing thrust was ap­
parently meant as, and understood by his audience
as, a direct attack an Dean Langdell, who may in-
deed have been seated in the front row." Holmes, a
nineteenth century man, was not without his own
ideas of process. He hypothesized that the inevit­
able course of legal development is from a starting
point at which rules of law are based on moral judg­
ments about subjective fault or guilt toward an end
point at which all moral content will have disap­
peared and the defendant's state of mind will have
become irrelevant. At the hypothetical end point,
law should become, as he liked to put it, formal, ob­
jective and external.'? However, Holmes succeeded,
as the Langdellians did not, in keeping his theory
open-ended by his insistence that rules of law
merely reflect changing social conditions and must
change as they change." Thus the process which he
hypothesized was a never-ending one, never quite
to be completed, always to be started again from
scratch. The true Langdellians rejected or ignored
that complicated thought and pursued their own
cimple-minded search for truth. Never, I dare say,
has any field of law appeared to be as perfectly
structured, as free from any kind of fault or flaw, as
the law of contracts in Williston's great treatise."
The legal realists, after World War I, found the
entire Langdellian structure absurd and, during the
period of their ascendancy, effectively demolished
it." The realists, however, did not in the least chal­
lenge the basic idea that «law is a science." Lang­
dell's error lay in having analogized law to the
natural sciences. According to the realists, what law
Was like-indeed what law was-was a social science.
It soon came to be an article of faith that our fellow
social scientists had outstripped us in the quest for
truth and that we had much to learn from them.
Wherefore-under the bright banner of «interdis­
ciplinary studies"-we turned to the «models" which
the economists, the anthropoligists, the sociologists,
the psychologists and the psychoanalysts were more
than willing to provide us with. The interdiscipli­
narians were most successful when they remained at
the highest possible level of abstraction. When they
attempted to prove, through «empirical studies," the
:relationship of the theoretical model to the real
world, with which lawyers cannot help but be con­
Cerned, they mostly came to grief.14
After World War II the eager faith of the realists
Came to seem as absurd as the simple dogma of the
langdellians had seemed after World War 1. Now
that the natural sciences and the social sciences have
successively failed us, we are, it seems, to look to
history as our guiding star and steer our course by
that. I dare say that if we had started by looking
on ourselves as historians instead of scientists a
hundred years ago, we would have come out ap­
proximately where we have, since nineteenth cen­
tury ideas about history were quite as heavily in­
fluenced by the ideas of process, development and
sequence as were nineteenth century ideas about
science. But we are proposing to become historians
in the 1970s, not in the 1870s. I trust that the his­
torical approach to law will not be made the vehicle
or the excuse for a further prolongation of our al­
ready over-long affair with the nineteenth century.
Belief in the inevitability of progress has not quite
disappeared from among us. Mr. Chiao Kuan-hua,
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Re­
public of China, remarked in the course of his first
address to the General Assembly of the United Na­
tions:
13
Countries want independence, nations want lib­
eration and the people want revolution. This
has become an irresistible trend of history.
Human society invariably makes constant
progress, and such progress is always achieved
through innumerable revolutions and trans­
formations ....
The advance of history and social progress
gladdens the hearts and inspires the peoples of
the world and throws into panic a handful of
decadent reactionary forces who do their ut­
most to put up desperate struggles ....
. .. Although there are twists and turns and
reverses in the people's struggles, adverse cur­
rents against the people and against progress,
in the final analysis, cannot hold back the main
current of the continuous development of hu­
man society.
The world will surely move toward progress
and light, and definitely not toward reaction
and darkness."
No doubt the Davids of this world who have,
against the odds, finished off some pitiful, helpless
Goliath are, forever after, inclined to take the op­
timistic view. But what about the rest of us?
To people who are professionally situated as law-
14 yers are, the idea that the future is, or can be made,
predictable is almost irresistably appealing. "The
object of our study," Holmes told us, "is prediction"
and went on to say that the very idea of law comes
down to "prophecies of what the courts will do in
fact, and nothing more pretentious . . .. "16 Instinc­
tively, we nod approvingly. Indeed, if we are not
certified soothsayers, qualified fortune tellers, expert
readers of the crystal ball, what is it that we are sup­
posed to be doing? Lawyers in practice advise their
clients on the legality or illegality of their proposed
course of action or on whether they will win or lose
their case if it comes to litigation. Professors who
write law review articles and treatises look on them­
selves as a sort of service of supply, whose function
is to provide the shock troops in the law offices and
courtrooms with the weaponry which will insure
victory. The good lawyer is the one whose predic­
tions are consistently correct-whose prophecies turn
out to coincide with what actually comes to pass.
Closely allied, in the legal mind, with the idea
of predictability is the idea of certainty. The two
ideas, in the legal context, are so closely related as
to be very nearly identical twins. If the law is cer­
tain, then we shall be able to give our clients sound
advice on what they should or should not do. If the
law is uncertain, if the precedents are ambiguous, if
the statute is badly drafted, then the best we can
say (if we are honest) is that the question is interest­
ing, but no one really knows what the answer is.
Our obsessive need for certainty has led us to
place a high premium on unity of doctrine. Few
things are more frustrating to a lawyer than the situ­
ation in which it appears that there are competing
rules but that nobody really knows which rule is
followed in state X.1? Even worse is the situation in
which it appears that within a single jurisdiction
there are divergent lines of cases, never cross-cited
to each other, which, on identical facts, lead to op­
posite results." The great treatises of the golden
age before World War I were essentially attempts
to reduce the evident diversity of case law to a
formal unity. If the "majority rule" and the "minor­
ity rule" could not plausibly be collapsed into a
single rule, then the "better rule" was confidently
stated, with the regretful notation that a few aber­
rant jurisdictions had not, as yet, seen the light.
In the 1920s the first series of Restatements pursued
the same goal on what could be called a quasi­
statutory level. The draftsmen and sponsors of the
current second series of Restatements do not appear
to be entirely clear in their own minds what they
are about.
Our obsession with unity, certainty and predicta­
bility has led us to convert those values into ab­
solutes. Our goal-our Utopia-has been complete
unity, total certainty, absolute predictability. (Of
course if the goal had ever been reached or reach­
able, there would have been no need for lawyers
and our venerable profession would have been one
with the dodo and the dinosaur.) Our understand­
able professional concerns made us unusually vul­
nerable to nineteenth century theories which seemed
to promise exactly the things we most wanted and
needed. No doubt the same professional concerns
account for the fact that we were able to go on
living in the nineteenth century long after the bleak
light of the twentieth century had, in most quarters,
revealed that the bright Victorian promise had been
a hollow fraud.
The word "historicist" has come into use to de­
scribe the idea that the past can be arranged in a
meaningful sequence which will not only explain
the present but reveal the future. Let us by all
means become historians; let us not become his­
toricists." Let us resist the temptation to make the
real world conform to some all-purpose theoretical
model borrowed from our betters, the economists or
the sociologists, or even created for our own use.
Let us particularly refrain from saying that anything
that cannot be made to fit the model is "wrong" and
should be disregarded if it cannot be forcibly re­
pressed or turned into its own opposite. I do not in
the least mean to suggest that whatever is is right or
that we should always float with the stream or vote
with the majority. I am, however, deeply suspicious
of value judgments which are presented as the log­
ically inevitable consequences which flow from the
unchallengeable premises of whatever theoretical
model is assumed to be true.
Historicism in its origins looked to the future,
which was usually conceived to be utopian. We
have the misfortune to live in the future which the
first generation of historicists could only dream of.
Most of us find that the present condition of the
human race leaves much to be desired. Our twen-
tieth century despair has led some of us to a sort of
perverted historicism in reverse which finds utopia
at some more or less distant point in the past. Once
upon a time economic laws worked as they are sup­
posed to; the streams of legal doctrine ran sweet and
pure; order, tranquillity and harmony governed our
society. If, by a strict construction of the Constitu­
tion and a stern repression of all antisocial behavior,
we can return to our lost paradise, all will be well.
This reverse historicism has the merit of being active
instead of passive. I cannot see that there is any­
thing else to be said for it.
However, apart from some version of historicism,
what point can there be to the study of the past? If,
say, the doctrine of consideration is moribund or
dead, why waste our time-and our students' time­
in reconstructions of what the doctrine was once
supposed to mean? If we eschew historicism, can
we escape the reproach that our historical studies
are mere-as it is usually put-antiquarianism?
III
This lecture inaugurates a series of lectures on
legal history named in honor of the late William
Winslow Crosskey. The thesis of Professor Cross­
key's great work Politics and the Constitutiotv" was
that the Constitution had been intended to establish
a central government of plenary powers. That inten­
tion, he argued, had been subverted as the result of
the political controversies-particularly the question
of slavery-which raged during the first half century
of the life of the Republic. The advocates of the
position that the Constitution established a central
government of severly limited powers eventually
prevailed-and that has, of course, ever since been
the orthodox view of the matter, even while the
federal government has been in process of becom­
ing, de facto if not de jure, the sort of government
which, if Crosskey was right, we were originally
tneant to have. Failing health made it impossible
for him to complete his work. The two volumes
which he published were devoted to establishing
what the original intention of the Founding Fathers
had been. The volumes which would have detailed
the process by which their intention was subverted
were never written.
The Crosskey thesis was savagely attacked by
l110st of the constitutional law experts of the time.
I am not in any sense a constitutional law expert,
so that my own opinion carries no great weight.
However, for what it is worth, my thought is that
the attacks on Crosskey were most successful when
they were directed to peripheral aspects of his argu­
ment-such as the question of judicial review-with
the reader being invited to conclude that, if Cross­
key was wrong (or had overlooked much available
evidence) on this point, he must be wrong on all the
other points toO.21
I have heard it said, however, that, even if Cross­
key was right, it was all a great waste of time and
effort. Suppose that Madison and others had indeed
falsified the historical record. Their hoax or fraud
or forgery having succeeded, what difference can it
make what the Constitution was originally supposed
to mean? Surely it is not seriously proposed to scrap
a hundred and fifty years of history simply because
words like "commerce" and "among" and "states"
carried different meanings in the late eighteenth
century from the meanings they now have. And, if
that is not what is being proposed, what is there in
Politics and the Constitution except antiquarianism­
and mere antiquarianism at that?
I take it that the thought which is implicit in the
"mere antiquarianism" line is that historical study
is worthwhile or justifiable only if the result illumi­
nates-is, as we said a year or two ago, relevant to­
our present condition." Absent relevance, there is
only an aimless rooting around in the trash heap of
history, which is no more to be recommended than
any other type of scavenging operation.
The idea that the only use of the past is to ex­
plain the present illustrates, I suggest, another of the
vices of historicism-which is its tendency grossly to
oversimplify the historical process." At any given
moment in time, there exists an indefinite number of
possibilities for future development. We know that
this is true when we look around us. But when we
look backward in time, we can see that, of all the
things that might have happened, only a few were
made flesh. In the historicist reconstruction, only
the things that actually happened count; the things
that might have happened, but did not, are cast out
of the equation. Under the historicist hypothesis
that the course of history is predetermined and in­
evitable, the only relevant facts about the past are
those which can be made to fit into what later
15
16 turned out to be the actual course of events. By
picking out a few "relevant" facts and ignoring
everything else, we succeed in reducing the past to
a logical and orderly sequence and in persuading
ourselves that what happened in fact was the only
thing that could have happened.
It was the great merit of Professor Crosskey's work
to have demonstrated that the conventional reading
of our constitutional history involved a considerable
amount of historicist oversimplication. He restored
to public view a great deal which had been swept
under the rug for the past hundred years. Scorn and
derision were heaped on him because, ultimately, he
failed to prove that his own reading of the consti­
tutional text was the only one which a competent
lawyer or a reasonably well-informed citizen could
have entertained in the 1780s and 1790s. He may
indeed, in the heat of argument, have overstated his
case. But he did prove that the reading of the text
which was, for example, put forward by Hamilton
and Madison and Jay in the Federalist Papers was
not the only possible one either-which was already
a considerable accomplishment.
The trouble with oversimplifying the past is that
it leads us to be overly doctrinaire about the present
and the future. Even though we know perfectly
well that we cannot predict who is going to win the
next election or the next war or the next revolution,
we turn our straightline historicist reconstruction
into a model which allows us-indeed compels us­
to say that there is only one correct course to be
followed. We become, in our own minds, prophets
of a divine revelation and all those who disagree
with us are consigned to eternal damnation. On the
other hand, the historian who shows us that what in
fact happened need -not have happened the way it
did or need not have happened at all enriches our
understanding of the past and, consequently, puts
us in a position where we can deal more rationally
with the infinitely complex problems which confront
us. The argument that historical study which has no
direct and immediate relevance to our present con­
dition is "mere antiquarianism" is simply another as­
pect of the historicist fallacy.
IV
The historical approach to the study of law has, if
we go about it properly, much to recommend it. I
doubt, however, that it will lead the law schools into
another golden age. The Langdellians and the re­
alists, in successive generations, promised their fol­
lowers the truth. The promise of truth, so long as it
is believable and believed, naturally generates an
almost superhuman enthusiasm and leads to accom­
plishment of no common order. Without Langdell's
truth, we would not have had the extraordinary out­
pouring of energy which, for the first time, or­
ganized the scattered and disparate materials of the
common law into a comprehensible pattern. We
find today that they overorganized; their patterns
had a geometrical precision which is not of this
world. But the very failure of their attempt to con­
fine the law within a formally perfect logical system
has left us largely in their debt. Without the realists'
truth, we would lack many insights into the com­
plexity of the decisional process which we owe
them. We can see that they uncritically accepted as
truths theories which were compounded largely of
guesswork and error. But the truth is, if I may be
permitted to use such a term, that the enthusiastic
pursuit of error leads, as often as not, to major dis­
coveries.
Situated as we are in time, we are in no position
to offer our students-or ourselves-the consolations
of Utopia. Only our new-found Chinese friends are
still able to muster up belief in the inevitable march
of history and in the progressive improvement of
human society. Perhaps the law school of the Uni­
versity of Peking stands even now at the threshhold
of its golden age. The best we have to offer is a dis­
enchanted rationalism which is not too sure of any­
thing any more-v-which is not the sort of production
which has ever brought any audience to its feet
cheering.
Optimism in the late twentieth century consists in
believing that the course of history is not prede­
termined. Luckily, there is no reason to believe that
it is; a hundred years of effort to prove the contrary
have not produced a single theory which has ever
proved anything. There is no reason to believe that
there are not real alternatives of choice. We can go
this way or that way. We can sink but it is, so far
as we can know, equally possible that we can swim­
Only in retrospect will we-or the generations which
come after us-know whether our choices have been
wise or foolish-which need not inhibit us from mak-
ing them as wisely and rationally and responsibly
as we know how.
Whether we look on ourselves as historians or as
problem solvers, as philosophers or as activists, let
us do what we can to preserve our students from
the simplistic beliefs that there can ever be easy
answers to hard questions, that the correct course
which we should follow can ever be known in ad­
vance, that the process of decision can ever be re­
duced to one of logical deduction from infallible
premises.
A major function of law is to provide a mechanism
for the orderly and peaceful settlement of disputes.
In times of order and tranquility the mechanism
works smoothly and well. In times of disorder and
conflict it works progressively less well. In such
times it seems, to many people, both plausible and
comforting to say that the breakdown of law is the
cause of our disorder and that all will be well if we
have more law and more laws and enforce them
strictly. That misconceives the nature of law and
overstates what, through law, can be accomplished.
Law has never been the salvation of any society.
A society is in good health when its legal system
enlists the voluntary suffrage of the great majority
of the citizens. A society is diseased when there is
a widespread popular distrust of the system. But
cramming more law down the throats of the people
will merely aggravate the disease. It was said of
the Romans that they made a desert and called it
peace. It is equally possible to make a desert and
call it law.
In a time of troubles the demand for truth far
outruns the available supply. I trust we will not
delude ourselves or others with the belief that we
have, or ever will have, the truth-about man, about
his society or even about the law.
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that, from the beginning, the Constitution commit­
ted to it. Too often, the Senate has treated and
continues to treat federal judicial appointments as
though they were mere matters of patronage to
be dispensed at the whim of the Senators from the
state of origin of the appointee. A look at the rec­
ords of this Committee will, I 'think, reveal how
lightly most hearings on judicial competence of
nominees are actually treated.
So long as you have given me the courtesy of this
forum, I will impose one suggestion for change in
judicial tenure that I think is appropriate. And I
believe that it is one that will not interfere with the
essential of judicial independence. I refer to the
desirability of a compulsory retirement age for ju­
dicial personnel. For history has shown us that, so
long as retirement is a matter of discretion with the
individual jurists, there are some who will sit as
judges long after they have lost the capacity to do
so. The history of the Supreme Court is replete with
examples of Justices whose mental or physical con­
ditions precluded them from exercising the arduous
functions that must be performed by federal judicial
officers. I cannot, of course, deny that many of our
judges-Learned Hand is certainly a sterling ex­
ample-have continued to serve with distinction long
after any arbitrary retirement age would have
called for their departure. But I have reluctantly
come to the view that the price of physical or mental
debility among some judges is too high a price to
pay for the continuance on the bench of those few
whose excellence is not dimmed by age.
I conclude by exhorting you to reject S.J. Res. 106.
Its benefits are dubious at best; its costs are likely to
be exhorbitant. We cannot afford the strains on our
constitutional system that this subordination of the




Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. I wouldlike to welcome you to the first William Cross­
key Lecture in Legal History at The University of
Chicago Law School. The Crosskey Lectureship
has been established to honor the memory of Wil­
liam Winslow Crosskey, the distinguished scholar
and teacher of Commercial and Constitutional Law
and legal history, who was a member of this faculty
from 1935 to 1962. I know that our speaker will
comment on Professor Crosskey, but I hope that you
will forgive me if I say a word or two about him on
this inaugural occasion.
Crosskey came to The University of Chicago after
a distinguished career at Yale College and Yale Law
School, a long clerkship with Chief Justice William
Howard Taft, and a brief practice with the Davis,
Polk firm in New York. He was brought to the Law
School to create courses in Federal Taxation and
Public Utilities, subjects which were newly being in­
troduced to the curriculum during those early days
of the New Deal. His great virtue, I take it, was
thought to be his considerable practical experience
and orientation, but as it turned out Crosskey's ca­
reer here was to be that of the pure scholar. Harry
Kalven has described the curious way in which his
research began. It was "gently" suggested to Cross­
key that he ought to publish a Law Review article
or two in order to justify his retention on the faculty,
These remarks were delivered by Stanley N. Katz,
Professor of Legal History at The University of
Chicago Law School, at the inaugural William
Crosskey Lecture in Legal History on May 4, 1972.
and Crosskey decided that the easiest thing to do
would be to revise an extensive memorandum on the
jurisdictional reach of the Securities Act which he
had prepared while practicing with John W. Davis
on Wall Street. He therefore descended into the
basement of the old Law School library in order to
begin his work, but not until twenty years had
passed did he finally emerge (in 1953) with his great
two volume study, Politics and The Constitution.
Crosskey's thesis in his dramatically revisionist
book was that the framers of the Constitution, when
properly understood, had not intended to create a
federal system in which the states would play a
powerful and somewhat independent role. Rather,
he argued, the Constitutional Convention intended
a system in which the national government should
be supreme, the states barely more than adminis­
trative subdivisions, and that Congress should have
sweeping powers, subject only to the procedural re­
view of the Supreme Court. The Bill of Rights, he
thought, was clearly intended to be applicable to the
states under the Privileges and Immunities clause.
Crosskey's thesis was worked out at great length and
with infinite care, with a special reference to the pre'
cise contemporary meanings of language which the
framers had employed.
The book startled its scholarly audience and
found several distinguished reviewers, men such as
Judge Charles E. Clark, Walton Hamilton, and our
own colleague Malcolm Sharp, who praised it as the
most important contribution ever made to constitu­
tional history. A smaller number of equally eminent
reviewers greeted the book with outrage and cow
tempt. The heat of the controversy is difficult to
imagine at twenty years distance, but it can perhaps
be best suggested in the language used by Henry
Hart in his lengthy attack in Volume 67 of the Har­
vard Law Review. Hart referred to Crosskey as "the
Don Quixote of Chicago," "the Knight of La Man­
cha, the Knight of Hyde Park," and spoke of Cross­
key's two volumes as "a farrago of fancy, rendered
plausible only by a confident tongue, nice printing,
and an abundance of notes and appendices referring
to obscure documents and esoteric word meanings."
1 think it is fair to say that professional legal and
constitutional historians have come down on the
side of Hart's intellectual position, if not his eti­
quette, and yet, speaking personally, 1 must say that
1 cannot think of any dozen books on the Constitu­
tion which have taught me half as much as I've
learned from Crosskey's remarkable pair.
Crosskey the man must have been remarkable.
Reading the tributes to him collected in Volume 35
of The University of Chicago Law Review, one gets
a sense of the man. All of the commentators refer to
Crosskey's brilliant success as a teacher, his strength
of mind, and his austere independence. He seems
to have had a very warm side to his personality and
he obviously made a profound impression on those
who knew him well.
He was also a considerable character. Harry Kal­
ven says, "I am confident he compiled one of the
world's great records for unbroken nonattendance at
faculty meetings, thus realizing the secret dream of
faculties everywhere." Abe Krash remembers the
opening lecture of his course on Constitutional His­
tory in 1947. On the opening day of the term, he
arrived in the classroom a few minutes late, thumped
the four volumes of Farrand's The Records of The
Federal Convention onto the desk in front of him
with a loud bang, and began substantially as fol­
lows:
You have all heard, gentlemen, that James Mad­
ison is the father of the Constitution; that Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. of Massachusetts was
our greatest Supreme Court Justice; and that
Louis Dembitz Brandeis was the leading au­
thority on the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Before 1 finish this summer, 1 propose to dem­
onstrate to you that Madison was a forger-
he tampered with the notes he kept of the de­
bates at the federal constitutional convention in
order to suit his own political advantage and
that of his party. Holmes undoubtedly knew a
great deal about old English law, but he was
not the most eminent authority on American
constitutional history. As for Brandeis, his opin­
ion in Erie v. Tompkins demonstrates that he
did not understand the true meaning of the
judiciary provisions in Article II of the Consti­
tution.
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Charles Gregory remembers that Crosskey never
bothered to prepare his cases for the classes he at­
tended as a student, although he was the first man
in his class at Yale. "One day Charlie Clark called
on Crosskey to state a case. I'm afraid we sniggered
at his equivocal recitation; and he brought down the
house by boldly declaring, 'Professor Clark, if you
can control your class, perhaps we could get some­
where with this case.' Nevertheless Crosskey always
insisted that before the final exam in each course he
read every case in the book-a claim we had to
believe when he turned up with the usual string
of A's."
And Malcolm Sharp, who continues to be the
most distinguished of the Crosskeyites, writes in a
more serious vein, "His wisdom is concealed from
the wise but revealed to the simple. He has re­
stored the Constitution to the simple structure which
every sixth-grader or high school student thinks it
has. The powers of Congress, Executive, and par­
ticularly Court are seen to be much more modern,
much more suitable to the current age, than the
patchwork which the court has made of the Consti­
tution since the Jeffersonians began to confuse our
understanding." It was only at a happy lunch I had
with Professor Sharp two weeks ago that 1 began to
get a true feel and appreciation for Crosskey the
man-and to discover what apparently only Cross­
key and Sharp have known all these years, that
Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglas 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
1 (1805) is the greatest case in the history of the
United States Supreme Court.
Crosskey was a remarkable man, one of the most
eminent scholars associated with this institution,
and certainly the originator of what 1 hope will be
a continuing tradition in legal history here.
22 Our speaker this evening is Grant Gilmore, who
doubtless needs no introduction to most of this audi­
ence. There is no more distinguished scholar on
this faculty nor anyone held in greater esteem by
the student body as a teacher. The bare, biograph­
ical facts of his career are these.
He was born in Boston, Massachusetts and re­
ceived his education entirely at Yale, where he was
awarded the Bachelor's degree in 1931, the Ph.D.
in 1936, and the LL.B. in 1942. Professor Gilmore's
graduate work was in Romance Languages, and his
dissertation a brilliant study of the poetry of Mal­
larme. He taught French at Lehigh University for
a year, and for three years at Yale. After switching
to the law, he practiced briefly with the Millbank,
Tweed firm in New York and served for a year in the
Office of the General Counsel of the U.S. Naval
Reserve. He began his law teaching career at Yale
in 1946 and came here as the Harry A. Bigelow Pro­
fessor of Law in 1965. His two major publications
are The Law of Admiralty, published in 1957 in
collaboration with Charles L. Black, Jr., and his
treatise on Security Interests in Personal Property,
which was published in 1965. The Security Interests
book won the rarely awarded Harvard Law School
Ames Prize in 1966 and the Coif Award of the
Association of American Law Schools in 1967. After
the death of Mark DeWolfe Howe, Professor Gil­
more was selected to complete the multi-volume
biography of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and that
is his major scholarly interest at the moment.
His topic this evening is "The Age of Antiquarius:
Legal History in a Time of Troubles." It is a great
pleasure for me to introduce Professor Gilmore
to you.
Malcolm P. Sharp, Professor Emeritus of Law.
Professor Sharp is shown here at a recent




Spencer L. Kimball will join the
faculty as Professor of Law this fall.
At the same time Professor Kimball
will become Executive Director of
the American Bar Foundation,
succeeding Dallin Oaks.
Mr. Kimball is presently Dean of
the University of Wisconsin Law
School. A graduate of the University
of Arizona in 1940, he attended
Oxford University as a Rhodes
Scholar and there earned the B.C.L.
degree in 1949. He also received an
S.J.D. degree from the University
of Wisconsin in 1958. He was a
member of the faculty at the
University of Utah Law School, and
served as its dean before joining the
University of Michigan law faculty




Mr. Kimball is a leading authority
in the field of Insurance Law. His
teaching fields have included
Contracts, Insurance, Legal History,
and Jurisprudence.
KOTZ, VISITING PROFESSOR
OF LAW THIS FALL
Once again the Law School is
privileged to announce that Hein D.
Kotz, presently a member of the
Faculty of Law of the University of
Konstanz, Germany, will be Visiting
Professor of Law in the Autumn
Quarter 1972. Mr. Kotz will offer
a course on Comparative Legal
Institutions, one of the two courses
he gave during his first visit to the
Law School in the Winter and
Spring Quarters 1971.
After initially studying law at the
University of Munich, Mr. Kotz
received his Master of Comparative
Law degree from the University of
Michigan in 1963. On the basis of
a comparative analysis of the
Anglo-American trust and its
functional counterparts in German
law Mr. Katz was awarded a
Doctor of Jurisprudence degree from
the University of Hamburg that
same year.
Formerly a Research Associate at
the Max Planck Institute of
Comparative Law and International
Private Law in Hamburg, Mr. Kotz
co-authored a two-volume treatise
on comparative law with Konrad
Zweigert, Director of the Max
Planck Institute.
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BIGELOW FELLOWS FOR 1972
Each year five Bigelow Fellows
are selected from outstanding
first degree graduates of law schools
and/or practising lawyers who are
interested in a teaching career. The
Bigelow Teaching Fellowship was
first established in 1947 in honor of
the late Harry A. Bigelow, Dean of
the Law School from 1929-1939
and a member of the Law School
faculty from 1904 until his death in
1950. Bigelow Teaching Fellows
receive the title of Instructor and
assist in the First Year Tutorial
Program.
Among those Fellows chosen for
the academic year 1972-73
Bartholomew Lee, also a Bigelow
Fellow for 1971-72, has been named
Senior Bigelow Teaching Fellow
and Instructor. Bart Lee, who was
born in Teaneck, New Jersey,
received his B.A. in 1968 from
St. John's College in Maryland and
his J.D. in 1971 from the Law
School. For the last year he has
been taking courses in the
Graduate School of Business,
pursuing his special interest in the
field of Law and Economics, as well
as carrying a full teaching load here
at the Law School.
John Basten is another in a long
line of Bigelow Fellows educated at
Oxford University. This past year
Mr. Basten has been working on his
B.C. L., a post-graduate degree in
Law, at Magdalen College. Although
born in England, he received his
LL.B. degree from Adelaide Law
School, Australia, in May 1970,
24 where he was styled a "Stow
Scholar," having received that prize
for several successive years. Mr.
Basten intends to practice at the
Australian Bar.
Janet Sue Harring is presently
working for The Honorable Thomas
E. Fairchild, U. S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in Mil­
waukee. A National Merit Scholar,
Ms. Harring received a B.A. in 1968
from Macalester College in St. Paul,
Minnesota. In 1971 she received her
J.D. magna cum laude from the
University of Wisconsin, where she
was on Law Review and a member
of the Order of the Coif. Her ex­
perience in 1971 as an instructor in
legal writing for first-year students
at the University of Wisconsin Law
School should stand her in good
stead as a Bigelow. Ms. Harring has
also worked in a legal capacity for
several firms; in 1971 she was a
summer associate for the Wall
Street firm of Cleary, Gottlieb,
Stein & Hamilton. Ms. Harring is
a native of Scottsbluff, Nebraska.
A 1972 graduate of the Law
School, Donna Marie Murasky is a
member of the Order of the Coif
and a recipient of the Hinton Moot
Court Competition Award to winners
of the third-year competition in
brief-writing and oral argument. Ms.
Murasky was born in Detroit,
Michigan and received her B.A. in
1969 from Barnard College in New
York. This summer Ms. Murasky is
working as a lawyer for Businessmen
for the Public Interest in Chicago.
Born in London, England,
Anthony Jon Waters represents a
second British Bigelow chosen by
the Law School this year. Having
received his B.A. in 1972 from the
University of Keele in Staffordshire,
Mr. Waters has been working on a
joint degree (the equivalent of the
American LL.B.) in Law and
American Studies there. In the
summer of 1971 Mr. Waters clerked
for the San Francisco firm of Heller,
Ehrmann, White & McAuliffe.
Mr. Water's article on one
aspect of the Theft Act 1968,
"Obtaining a pecuniary advantage
by deception," was recently accepted
for publication by The Criminal
Law Review.
ALLARD JOINS UNIVERSITY
Jean Allard J.D. 1953 was appointed
Vice President for Business and
Finance at The University of
Chicago on May 1st. In her new
position she is concerned with the
administration of The University's
financial operations and business
affairs.
Most recently she had been Gen­
eral Counsel and Secretary of the
Maremont Corporation of Chicago.
She received a B.A. degree from
Culver-Stockton College and an
M.A. from Washington University
in St. Louis in 1947. She was grad­
uated from The University of
Chicago Law School in 1953. She
served as Managing Editor of the
Law Review.
Jean Allard
Prior to her Maremont position
she had been associated with the
Chicago law firm of Lord, Bissell
and Brook and previous to that the
Toledo firm of Fuller, Harrington,
Seney and Henry. From 1956-1958
she was Assistant Dean in the Law
School, in charge of the admin­
istrative coordination of the Ford
Foundation Research and Foreign
Law Student programs.
HONORARY DOCTOR OF LAWS
RECEIVED BY DAWSON
At the 340th Convocation of The
University of Chicago on June 9,
1972 John Philip Dawson, a noted
historian of Anglo-American law,
was awarded the honorary degree of
Doctor of Laws. Because of Mr.
Dawson's scholarship a revived
interest can be seen in the area
of comparative legal history: A
History of Lay Judges (1960) de­
veloped from his research in the
Bacon Collection of manorial court
records at The University Library,
when he was a visiting member of
the Law School faculty in 1955;
The Oracles of the Law (1968) re­
ceived the Association of American
Law Schools' triennial Order of the
Coif Award. Mr. Dawson is also a
leading scholar of the modern law of
restitution and an authority on law
of contracts and equity.
Born in Detroit in 1902, Mr.
Dawson received a J.D. from the
University of Michigan in 1924,
thereafter attending Oxford as a
Rhodes Scholar, where he received
a D. Phil. in 1927. From 1927 to
1956 he taught at the University of
Michigan Law School; since then he
has taught at Harvard Law School.
The presentation made to him by
Dean Phil C. Neal is quoted
in full below.
President Edward H. Levi is shown with
John Philip Dawson, Fairchild Professor of
Law at Harvard University, at the
Convocation ceremonies on June 9th at
Rockefeller Chapel. Mr. Dawson was awarded
an honorary degree of Doctor of Laws.
PRESENTATION
I present, as a candidate for the
degree of Doctor of Laws, John
Philip Dawson, Fairchild Professor
of Law at Harvard University.
During a career of more than
forty years in legal education, Pro­
fessor Dawson has by his scholarship
left a deep imprint on a remarkable
range of studies. He is the nation's
pre-eminent scholar of the law of
restitution. His casebooks on
contracts, equity, and restitution are
used throughout the country. Pro­
fessor Dawson is also among the
most distinguished of American
comparative lawyers, the author of
several specialized studies on French
and German law, and of a major
contribution to the literature of
comparative law.
Professor Dawson's transcendent
achievement has been his work in
yet another subject, legal history.
His teaching materials on English
legal history have opened the field
to many students. His two great
works of comparative legal history
treat the grand themes of the history
of lay and of professional judges in
the several Western legal cultures.
These two books have won de­
served scholarly acclaim. Indeed,
they have been themselves historic
events in the progress of legal his­
tory, reinvigorating the comparative
tradition after a prolonged malaise.
It is my great privilege, Mr.
President, to present Professor John
Philip Dawson for the degree of
Doctor of Laws.
THE 1972 FUND FOR
THE LAW SCHOOL
The 1972 Fund for the Law School
will commence on September 1st and
conclude December 31st 1972.
Now in its 19th Year the Fund for
the Law School continues to provide
the most important source of un­
restricted funds available directly
to the School.
Co-Chairmen of the Fund for the
Law School will again be Maurice S.
Weigle J.D. '35 and Elmer W.
Johnson J.D. '57. Additional
members will be invited to join the
Dean's Fund, which is open to all
alumni. In order to become a
member an alumnus is asked to con­
tribute at least $250 to the Fund
for the Law School. A special rate
of $lOO is extended to alumni who
have been out of the Law School
for less than lO years (since 1962).
The following membership in the
Dean's Fund are available: Charter
Member ($5000 or more), Sustaining
Member ($lOOO or more), Sup­
porting Member ($500 or more),
and Member.
All gifts received before December
31st will qualify an alumnus for
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membership in the Dean's Fund.
The 1971 Fund for the Law
School raised a total of $232,790.34.
The solicitation publications used
during the 1971 Fund for the Law
School were accorded honors in
recent publication competition of
the American Alumni Council.
Pieces were judged by one criteria­
excellence. The Law School pieces
were judged "the best of the good."
NEW SPECIAL FUNDS FOR
THE LAW SCHOOL
This past year several special funds
have been established at the
Law School.
The D. Francis Bustin Educational
Fund for the Law School was estab­
'Iished by a provision of the will of
D. Francis Bustin, a 1917 alumnus
of The University, to give awards or
prizes from time to time for a val­
uable and important contribution,
proposal, or suggestion for the im­
provement and betterment of the
processes, techniques, and pro­
cedures of our Government or any
of its branches, departments, at city,
state, or Federal level.
The William B. Graham Endow­
ment Fund was established by
William B. Graham J.D. 1936 to
assist in providing financial support
to strengthen the faculty of the
Law School.
26 The Stuart Cardell Hyer
Scholarship Fund established as a
memorial to Stuart C. Hyer J.D.
1955 by his parents Ebba Cardell
Hyer and Stanton E. Hyer J.D. 1925.
The Archibald H. Kurland
Memorial Book Fund was estab­
lished in memory of Archibald H.
. Kurland by his family and friends.
The Morton C. Seeley Fund was
established by a bequest under the
will of Mrs. Rachel K. Seeley in
memory of her husband, Morton C.
Seeley, who was graduated from the
Law School in the Class of 1910.
The Alta N. and Channing L.
Sentz Loan Fund was established
for worthy and deserving students
by a bequest of Channing L. Sentz,
a graduate of the Law School in the
Class of 1908.
The Lester R. Uretz Memorial
Fund was established in memory of
Lester R. Uretz, a graduate of the
Law School in the Class of 1948, by
his family and friends.
The William W. and Tamara
Wilkow Scholarship Fund was
established by the William W. and
Tamara Wilkow Foundation to pro­
vide an annual scholarship for a
third-year student who maintained a
superior academic record for the first
two years of law school and who re­
quires financial assistance to com­
plete his or her legal education.
Mr. Wilkow was graduated from the
Law School in 1948.
RONALD COASE FIGURES IN
A LITTLE KNOWN
HISTORICAL EPISODE
Recently a memo was circulated in
the University community to
"Students of Little Known Historical
Episodes," containing an item which
may be of interest to those familiar
with the work of Ronald H. Coase,
Clifton R. Musser Professor of
Economics in the Law School and
Director of the Law and Economics
Program. The item cited originally
appeared in the Autobiography of
an Economist by Lord Robbins:
Francis Hemming's favorite
official occupation was the cor-
rection of other people's drafts.
He would gather round him a
small collection of his economists
and statisticians and then, with
pen ominously poised, he would
meditate aloud and invite as­
sistance on points of style rather
than substance. One such oc­
casion has become famous. A
member of the section had written
a report on the Timber Control,
in the course of which he had
passed certain strictures onthe
absence of reliable figures, adding,
however, that improvement might
shortly be expected since the
Control had "now appointed a
statistician." The bald simplicity
of this last statement worried our
director. He seized his pen,
erased the words "appointed a
statistician," and substituted with
obvious relish "have instituted a
statistical organization." This was
too much for his hearers who, one
and all, protested that the ap­
pointment of Mr. Ronald Coase,
though doubtless a very welcome
event, did not add up to the
institution of a statistical organiza­
tion. Hemming listened gravely,
Ronald H. Coase
and agreed that there was some
point in the objection. Then,
again taking his pen in that
enormous hand, he inserted an
omission mark before "a statis­
tical organization" and, in the
margin, inscribed the words
"the nucleus of."
The instigator of this memo is
obscured in anonymity.
CREATION OF ASSOCIATES PROGRAM
IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
An Associates Program in Law and
Economics has been established at
The University to encourage cor­
porate support of the Program in
Law and Economics. The Program
is rooted in a strong tradition of
inter-disciplinary studies at the Law
School developed in the period of
the mid-1930's to the present under
two distinguished economists, Henry
C. Simons and Aaron Director. An
important event in this development
was the founding of the Journal of
Law and Economics in the 1950's.
Under the editorship first of Pro­
fessor Director and then of R. H.
Coase, the Journal has become the
principle scholarly publication in
the world devoted to economic
analysis of legal problems.
The Program is presently directed
by Professor Coase, the Clifton R.
Musser Professor of Economics in
the Law School.
The aim of the Law and Eco­
nomics Program is to promote
understanding of the effects of laws
upon the economic system. The
Program fosters research on the
actual operation of laws and their
impact upon different business and
economic conditions, in specific
areas where the legal framework
exerts great influence. The research
joins the efforts of lawyers and
economists studying concrete prob­
lems. In contrast with dominant
tendencies in the field of economics
today which emphasize abstract
theories and mathematical analysis,
the Law and Economics Program is
concerned with the actual insti­
tutions and processes found in the
economic system.
Current research problems illus­
trating the scope of the Program's
concerns include the following:
economic function of property rights;
decisions in the field of accident law
from the standpoint of their effect
in promoting efficient allocation of
resources; land-use patterns ap­
pearing in the absence of intensive
control through zoning laws as
compared with highly-regulated
regimes characteristic of most
American cities; causes of large­
abandonment of buildings in urban
centers; a comprehensive economic
and legal analysis of the postal
system of the United States; the oil­
import-quota system; and the allo­
cation of enforcement resources by
the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice.
A continuing aspect of the
Program, the Antitrust Project,
consists of a series of detailed
studies of the economic significance
of major antitrust decisions.
The Associates Program in Law
and Economics is designed to in­
terest a small number of corporations
in becoming regular supporters of
this field of research.
LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE
In May the Law School sponsored
a Conference on Law and Economic
Development in Nineteenth Century
America. Chairman of the Con­
ference was Stanley N. Katz, Pro­
fessor of Legal History in the
Law School.
Although earlier work in this
relatively new field of American
Legal History was mainly concerned
with discrete problems in the
colonial period, the present approach
is essentially social scientific, study­
ing the interaction between law and
social change in the national period.
Thus, "Law and Economic Develop­
ment in Antebellum America" was
chosen as the organizing theme,
because it is the area in which the
most promising work is currently
being done.
Among the various topics dis­
cussed "Damage Judgements, Legal
Liability and Economic Develop­
ment Before the Civil War" was
presented by Morton J. Horwitz,
Professor of Law at Harvard Law
School. The central issue of this
first session was the economic sig­
nificance of tort law: whether the
formation of the negligence concept
in itself created conditions for legal
change, or whether it was a product
of a change which had previously
taken place.
Richard A. Posner, Professor of
Law in the Law School, spoke on
"The Accessibility of Legal Reme­
dies." Problems discussed in this
session were the following: how to
assess the litigiousness of American
society in the nineteenth century,
the reliability of appellate cases as
an index of the extent and nature of
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Norval Morris, Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Director, Center for Studies in Criminal
Justice; Owen M. Eiss, Professor of Law; Edmund W. Kitch, Professor of Law; John H.
Langbein, Assistant Professor of Law; and Stanley N. Katz, Professor of Legal History, discuss
with alumni "Recent Curriculum Trends" at the 1972 Law Alumni Day on May 12th.
28 private litigation in the past, the
relationship between settlements out
of court and the litigation of private
disputes.
In the third session Harry N.
Scheiber, Professor of History at the
University of California in San
Diego, spoke with the group on
"Eminent Domain and the Concept
of Public Purpose in State Courts."
Mr. Scheiber discussed whether or
not legal changes (in this case,
eminent domain) acted to subsidize
certain kinds of social activities at
the expense of others. In particular,
he wished to describe the transfer
of public protection to private prop­
erty in the eminent domain area.
In concluding the Conference,
Professor Katz led a discussion on
"A Critique of Research Areas and
Methodologies in Nineteenth Cen­
tury Legal History." Mr. Katz raised
problems of the uses of quantifi­
cation, the relevance of economic
theory, the need for comparative
study, the problem of regional vari­
ation within the American economy,
and the difficulty of using appellate
court cases as evidence.
This conference was funded by
the National Science Foundation.
Mr. Justice William H. Rehnquist
Harry G. Johnson, Professor of Economics at The University of Chicago, delivers the
sixth Henry Simons Lecture on May 18th in The Weymouth Kirkland Courtroom.
Mr. Johnson spoke on "The International Monetary System and the Rule of Law."
INAUGURAL CROSSKEY LECTURE
IN LEGAL HISTORY
The inaugural William Crosskey
Lecture in Legal History was held
in the Law School Auditorium on
May 4th. Grant Gilmore, Harry A.
Bigelow Professor of Law, spoke to
over 400 alumni, students, and
friends of the Law School on "The
Age of Antiquarius: Legal History
in a Time of Troubles."
Professor Crosskey was a member
of the faculty from 1935 until 1963
at which time he became Professor
Emeritus of Law. In 1968 following
his death the William Crosskey
Memorial Fund was established in
memory of Mr. Crosskey by his
students. This past year, following
an effort to raise money led by
Abe Krash '49, the Fund was des­
ignated The William Crosskey
Lectureship in Legal History.
Professor Gilmore's lecture ap­
pears in this issue of the Law School
Record as well as the introductory
comments made by Stanley N. Katz,
Professor of Legal History.
JOHNSON DELIVERS
SIMONS LECTURE
On May 18th the Sixth Henry
Simons Lecture was given by
Harry G. Johnson, Professor of
Economics at The University of
Chicago. Professor Johnson spoke
on "The International Monetary
System and the Rule of Law."
Since 1959 Mr. Johnson has been
Professor of Economics at The
University; he has also been Pro­
fessor of Economics at the London
School of Economics since 1966.
Born in Toronto, Canada, Mr.
Johnson received his B.A. degree ill
1943 from the University of Toront?­
In 1958 he received his Ph.D. in
Economics from Harvard University:
St. Francis Xavier University, the
University of Winsor, Queen's Uni�
versity, and Carleton College have
all awarded him the honorary degree
of Doctor of Laws (LL.D.).
In 1962 Mr. Johnson was elected
a Fellow of the American Acadern)'
of Arts and Sciences; he was also
elected Fellow of the British
Academy for the Promotion of His­
torical, Philosophical, and Philo­
logical Studies in 1969. Since 1966
he has been a member of the
Executive Committee of the Royal
Economic Society. Mr. Johnson is
chairman of the Association of Uni­
versity Teachers of Economics,
United Kingdom.
The Simons Lecture was es­
tablished in 1956 by the Relm
Foundation of Ann Arbor, Michigan.
It honors the late Henry Simons, a
professor at The University who
served for 29 years on the faculties
of the Department of Economics
and the Law School. Mr. Simons was
a leading spokesman for the classical
school of economics and was a
staunch advocate of free enterprise.
HINTON MOOT COURT
COMPETITION
On the evening of May 8th the final
argument for the Hinton Moot Court
Competition was held in the Wey­
mouth Kirkland Courtroom in the
Law School. Mr. Justice William H.
Rehnquist, Supreme Court of the
United States, The Hon. Elbert P.
Tuttle, U. S. Court of Appeals,
Fifth Judicial Circuit, and The Hon.
John Paul Stevens, U.S. Court of
Appeals, Seventh Circuit heard the
arguments for the case, Medical
Committee for Human Rights
v. S.E.C.
In the case before this court the
Medical Committee for Human
Rights appealed the decision of the
Securities and Exchange Commission
not to raise objection to Dow's
refusal to include in their proxy
statements a resolution that Dow
cease making napalm.
John G. Jacobs and Donna Marie
Murasky were the third-year stu­
dents who won the case on the basis
of brief-writing and oral argument.
RHEINSTEIN REVIEW
A recent review by Rene Konig,
Director of the Institute of So­
ciological-Research at the University
of Cologne and leading sociologist
in Europe, on Max Rheinstein's
recent book, Marriage, Stability,
Divorce and the Law, made these
commendations:
The highest expectations are
raised when a man of the ex­
perience and the caliber of Max
Rheinstein puts together his in­
vestigations about the problem of
divorce. These expectations are
fulfilled completely. The book
contains not only a masterly
treatment of the enormous mass
of legal and particularly compar­
ative material, it also constitutes
a product of serious sociological
thought. If the work is properly
received it will once and for all
terminate the sterile disputes
between legal scholars and so­
ciologists. A new start is made
not only in the matter of divorce
but in the relation between law
and sociology.
Mr. Rheinstein's book was
published by the University of
Chicago Press.
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A LEGAL NOTE ON CHAUCER
Bart Lee, Senior Bigelow Teaching
Fellow in the Law School, has
written a note on "A New and Legal
Pun in Chaucer: A Significatio for




Ten Law School students have been
named Ford Foundation Summer
Field Work Fellows for 1972. The
three-year program of summer fel­
lowships was set up under a Ford
Foundation Grant in which first­
and second-year law students intern
in agencies in state and local
government.
The aims of the program are to
broaden the understanding of law
graduates concerning the problem
of government at the state and local
The Honorable Elbert P. Tuttle, U. S. Court of Appeals Fifth Judicial Circuit;
Mr. Justice William H. Rehnquist, Supreme Court of the United States; and
The Honorable John Paul Stevens listen to an argument presented at the final
competition of the Hinton Moot Court Competition on May 8th.
30 levels; to interest students in the
possibility of careers in government;
to assist agencies of government by
providing short periods of service
by talented young men and women
with legal training; and to encourage
critical thought and scholarly re­
search on law related aspects of
.
state and local government.
Students receiving the awards
this year are Kathleen W. Bratton,
Christopher J. Duerksen, Philip E.
Garber, Jean M. Hamm, James B.
Jacobs, James Martin, Preston
Moore, Michael E. Pietzsch, Carl
W. Struby and Merideth Wright.
THE DEAN'S FUND
MEMBERS MEET
On May 11th members of The
Dean's Fund met for a seminar on
"New Problems of Lawyers' Lia­
bility: the SEC v. the National
Student Marketing Corporation."
Conducting the seminar was
Milton H. Cohen, a member of the
firm of Schiff Hardin Waite Dorschel
& Britton. Mr. Cohen had served
as Director of the Public Utilities
Division of the Securities and Ex­
change Commission (1943-1946) and
Director of the Special Study of
Securities Markets for the SEC
(1961-1963).
Members of the Dean's Fund also
participated in a special exhibition of
the Bacon Manuscripts on June 3rd
at the Joseph Regenstein Library.
Professors Stanley N. Katz and John
H. Langbein discussed the plans of
the Law School for studies in Legal
History and the significance of the
Bacon Collection for scholarship and
English legal, social, and economic
history. The Bacon Manuscripts are
a rare collection of manilla records
pertaining to the ecclesiastical
estates of the Abbey of Bury St.
Edmonds and the land holdings of
the family of Sir Nicholas Bacon.
They extend from the 13th through
the 18th century. These records are
part of The University's rare book
collection and were on exhibit in
Walter J. Blum, Professor of Law, Elmer W. Johnson J.D. '57, Co-Chairman of the
Law School Development Council, Milton H. Cohen, and Edmund W. Kitch,
Professor of Law, engage in a spirited discussion as other members of the Dean's Fund
listen. Mr. Cohen had conducted a seminar on "New Problems of Lawyers' Liability;
the SEC. v. the National Student Marketing Corporation."
the special collections area of the
new University library.
The Dean's Fund is in its first
year. Membership is available to
all alumni of the Law School and
is based on participation at certain
levels of giving of unrestricted gifts
to the Fund for the Law School.
SEMINAR ON LEGAL ETHICS
During the Spring Quarter, Professor
Stanley A. Kaplan conducted a
non-credit seminar on what is tra­
ditionally called "Legal Ethics" but
what Mr. Kaplan prefers to describe
as "Lawyers' Obligations." In the
seminar students addressed them­
selves to the many significant,
changing aspects of a lawyer's
obligations to his client and to the
legal system. In further discussion
problems of this character were
developed in connection with the
activities of lawyers in the areas of
tax, labor and criminal law and in
the handling of class action and
administrative law, other fields of
practice and the curriculum.
TRADITIONAL ILLINOIS
SUPREME COURT VISIT
Once each year the Illinois Supreme
Court is invited by the Law School
to hear several cases in the Wey-
mouth Kirkland Courtroom. This
invitation primarily benefits the
first-year law students who have the
opportunity to hear oral argument
in process.
On January 21, 1972 The
Honorable Robert C. Underwood
and other members of the Court
heard the cases, Illinois v. Gary
Handley, et al and Northwestern
University v. County Collector. The
issue in the first case concerned the
constitutionality of the waiver pro­
vision of the Illinois Juvenile Court
Act permitting the State's Attorney
to remove a case from the Juvenile
Court when the act constitutes a
crime even though a minor is in­
volved. Appellants of several
President Edward H. Levi ponders an
observation made at the 40th reunion
celebration of the Class of 1932.
murder convictions argued that such
removal is unconstitutional, since a
hearing on removal is not required
and there are no standards limiting
the State's Attorney's discretion. In
the case of Northwestern University
v. County Collector the issue was
the constitutionality of North­
western's exemption from taxation
in its state charter as applied to
property the University owns but
leases for commercial use. North­
western was appealing a lower court
holding that this exemption is un­
constitutional because the exemption
deprived other educational insti­
tutions and individual non-exempt




The study on "The Lay Judges in
the German Criminal Court" which
was conducted by Hans Zeisel,
Professor of Law and Sociology, and
Gerhard Casper, Professor of Law
and Political Science, has been well
received from many quarters. The
Federal Minister of Justice in Bonn
notes, "Your findings on the role of
lay judges in German criminal
procedure are of considerable im­
portance for our pending reforms of
the German criminal court system.
The analysis of the sociological
background is particularly en­
lightening."
From the University of Konstanz
Professor Friedrich Kubler writes,
"In view of the century old debate
(only recently Baur again called for
the abolition of lay judges) you and
Mr. Zeisel have rendered a great
service to German law through the
persuasive design and intelligent
evaluation of your study."
Joachim Herrmann of the Max
Planck Institute for Foreign and
International Criminal Law con­
cludes, "It was extraordinarily in­
teresting for me to see that the
speculations generally prevailing
about the significance of lay judges
have been corroborated by your
figures. However, your tables give
information not only about the
participation of lay judges but also
about the other questions regarding
criminal procedure for which so far
there has been no data available."
The study appeared in the first
issue of the Journal of Legal Studies,
a new publication at the Law School,
edited by Richard A. Posner,
Professor of Law.
CONVOCATION 1972 HONORS
At the 340th Convocation of The
University of Chicago, held on
June 9th, the following awards were
made to students at the Law School.
The Joseph Henry Beale Prize,
for outstanding work in the first-year
legal research and writing program,
was awarded to William Block,
James B. McHugh, Stuart Oran,
Fred Thomas, and James Whitehead.
The Jerome N. Frank Prize, for
the outstanding comment produced
by a third-year member of the
University of Chicago Law Review,
was awarded to Robert Paul
Schuwerk.
The Hinton Moot Court Compe­
tition Awards, to the winners of the
third-year competition in brief­
writing and oral argument, were
made to John G. Jacobs and Donna
Marie Murasky.
The Karl Llewellyn Memorial
Cup, for excellence in brief-writing
and oral argument in the second
Hinton Moot Court Competition,
was awarded to Peggy L. Kerr
and James R. Mikes.
The Casper Platt Award, for an
outstanding paper-by a student in
the Law School dealing with legal
problems in the field of criminal law,
administration of justice, social
legislation, or other problems of
immediate social significance, was
made to Vincent F. O'Rourke and
Douglas H. Ginsburg.
The United States Law Week
Award, to the graduating student
who has made the most satisfactory
scholastic progress in his final year
in the Law School, was made to
Michael Earl Chubrich.
The Wall Street Journal Award,
to a student in the Law School for
excellence in work in the field of
Corporation Law, was made to
Bruce Russell MacLeod.
Members of the Class of 1972
elected to the Order of the Coif
were as follows:
Stephen Bowen, John J. Buckley,
David N. Cook, Harlan Dellsy,
Howard Ervin, Aaron Hoffman,
Cary Klafter, Carl Mirikitani, Donna
Murasky, Vincent O'Rourke, Robert
I. Richter, Paul Ruttum, Robert
Schuwerk, Robert Smith, Dodge
Wells, and Mark Wintner.
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Gerhard Casper, Professor of Law
and Political Science, discussed the
six member jury at the Judicial
Conference of the Fourth Circuit
in White Sulfur Springs at the end
of June.
Owen M. Fiss, Professor of Law,
has just finished a casebook on
Injunctions-a new subject, al­
though an outgrowth .of the Equity
and Equitable Remedies courses
taught here at the Law School. It
will be published by Foundation
Press in late fall 1972.
The second edition of New
Perspectives on the American Past
has been published by Little, Brown.
Co-editors of this volume are
Stanley N. Katz, Professor of Legal
History, and Stanley Kutler. Mr.
Katz has been elected to a two-year
term on the Nominating Committee
of the Organization of American
Historians. This past year Mr. Katz
has been a Visiting Fellow at the
Newberry Library; a member of the
Advisory Committee, Project in
Legal History, American Bar Foun­
dation; a member of the organizing
committees of the American Society
for Legal History, Conference on the
Use of Plea Rolls in Legal History
(April 1973) and of the new Mid­
west Conference of Early American
Historians. Mr. Katz has recently
been appointed Associate Editor,
Reviews in American History (first
issue to appear in April of 1973).
Edmund W. Kitch, Professor of
Law at the Law School, has co­
authored a book with Harvey
Perlman entitled Legal Regulation of
the Competitive Process: Cases,
Notes and Problems on the Law of
Unfair Business Practices, Trade­
marks, Copyrights and Patents,
which was published in 1972 by
Foundation Press.
This spring Philip B. Kurland,
Professor of Law, has been involved
in a variety of activities which in­
cluded the filing of a Brief Amicus
on behalf of the United States
Senate in the case of United States
v. Gravel in the United States
Supreme Court. Mr. Kurland pre­
sented a paper on "Privileges and
Immunities Clause" at a Symposium
on the Fourteenth Amendment at
Washington University in St. Louis.
He gave a talk on the United States
Supreme Court at the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York.
As chief consultant to the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Sepa­
ration of Powers Mr. Kurland
has been involved in hearings on
Executive Agreements. Other
Washington activities included tes­
timony before the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments on Judicial Tenure.
He also addressed the Convention
of Justices of the Supreme Court
of New York.
Professors John H. Langbein, Franklin E. Zimring, and Stanley
N. Katz leaving Convocation ceremonies at Rockefeller Chapel.
John H. Langbein, Assistant Pro­
fessor of Law, is presently com­
pleting archive research on his
forthcoming book, "The Criminal
Process in the Renaissance." Mr.
Langbein was selected to receive a
Younger Humanist Fellowship from
the National Endowment for the
Humanities to facilitate this research.
This summer Mr. Langbein is at­
tending a Roman Law Institute at
Berkeley under the auspices of the
American Council of Learned
Societies.
This year's Law Review dinner,
held at The Quadrangle Club on the
evening of May 19th, was privileged
to have WFMT radio commentator
Studs Terkel as its speaker. Mr.
Terkel received his J.D. from the
Law School in 1934.
The names of the new Law
Review Managing Board were an­
nounced at that time by John J.
Buckley, out-going Editor-in-Chief,
who presided at the dinner. Eight
first- and second-year students have
been chosen as members of its
Managing Board for 1972-73:
elected to the position of Editor-in­
Chief is Ronald G. Carr; the Man­
aging Editor will be Kenneth V.
lIandal, and Frank H. Easterbrook
will be Topics and Comments
:E:ditor; Douglas H. Ginsburg will
be Article and Book Review Editor;
Comments Editors are Ronald A.
Cass, Robert W. Clark III, Richard
F. Fielding and Stewart R.
Shepherd.
Roy Lawrence, Law and Human­
ities Fellow in the Law School, has
recently written a book, Motive
and Intention: An Essay in the Ap­
preciation of Action. Mr. Lawrence's
book has been published by North­
western University as one of their
series in Publications in Analytical
Philosophy.
Hans W. Mattick has been
appointed Professor of Criminal
Tustice and the Director of the
Research Center in Criminal Justice
in the Department of Criminal
Justice, College of Liberal Arts and
Sciences, University of Illinois,
Chicago Circle Campus, effective
September 15th.
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Philip B. Kurland listens with a mixture of interest and skepticism to a student
at a recent Law School event held in honor of the graduating Class of 1972
and their families following Convocation.
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Bernard D. Meltzer
Bernard D. Meltzer, James Parker
Hall Professor of Law, has been
elected to the Board of Managers
of the Chicago Bar Association. He
was installed during the Association's
99th Annual Meeting held on
June 22nd.
Byron S. Miller J.D. '37, a
member of the firm of D'Ancona
Pflaum Wyatt & Riskind, was a
Lecturer in Law this past Winter
Quarter in the Law School. Mr.
Miller taught the course in Federal
Taxation III.
Norval Morris, Julius Kreeger
Professor of Law and Criminology
and Director of The Center for
Studies in Criminal Justice, has been
awarded a fellowship -in the Amer­
ican Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Other current activities include the
organization of the first National
Institute of Corrections for senior
Federal and state correctional ex­
ecutives for three weeks in July at
The University of Chicago Center
for Continuing Education. Mr.
Morris has co-edited with Mark
Perlman a book titled Law and
Crime: Essays in Honor of Sir
John Barry, which has just been
published by Gordon and Breach,
New York.
Max Rheinstein, Max Pam Pro­
fessor Emeritus of Comparative
Law, is presently working with
Mary Ann Glendon on a chapter
"Husband and Wife" for the
International Encyclopedia of
Comparative Law. Mr. Rheinstein
is Chief Editor of Volume 4
(Family Law) of the International
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law.
This summer Mr. Rheinstein is at­
tending a conference on "The Role
of Equity in the Legal Systems of
the World," being held in August
in Bellagio, Italy. Two publications
by Mr. Rheinstein appeared in
1971-72: Marriage, Stability, Di­
vorce and the Law, published by
the University of Chicago Press;
and the Law of Decedents' Estates
with Mary Ann Glendon, published
by Foundation Press.
A seminar was offered this Spring
Quarter in the Law School on "The
Effects of Legal Change: The Case
of the British 'Breathalyser' Legis­
lation." The seminar was taught by
H. Laurence Ross, Visiting Lecturer
in Law and Sociology. Mr. Ross,
a sociologist specializing in study of
the legal system, is Professor of LaW
and Sociology at the University of
Denver College of Law, where he
teaches courses on Law and Society,
Arbitration, and Negotiation. He is
currently in residence as a Visiting
Scholar at the American Bar Foun­
dation. His work includes a recent
book on the settlement process in
automobile accident cases, entitled
Settled Out of Court. At the Bar
Foundation he is working on a study
of the effects of the British crack­
down on drunken driving.
Max Rheinstein greets alumni at a recent reunion at the Law School.
Harry Kalven, Jr. and an exceptionally large number of appreciative students in a course
Spring Quarter on Freedom of Expression which involved a detailed study of problems of speech
that have a constitutional dimension, including such topics as prior restraints, obscenity, the
right of privacy, libel, group libel, fair trial and free press, congressional oaths, compulsory
disclosure laws, sedition, public-issue picketing, symbolic conduct, and protest in public places.
Adolf Sprudzs, Foreign Law
Librarian and Lecturer in Legal
Bibliography, has published a
comment in 66 The American
]ournal of International Law
365-376 (1972), entitled "Status of
Multilateral Treaties-Researcher's
Mystery, Mess or Muddle?" With
the assistance of a student library
assistant, Mr. Peter True, Mr.
Sprudzs has also compiled a
Chronological Index to Multilateral
Treaties in Force for the United
States (as of January 1, 1972),
which was published as No.8 in
the Law Library's Bibliographies
and Guides to Research series. The
Chronological Index is available
from the Law School at $6.00 a copy.
At the invitation of the United
Nations Institute for Training and
Research Mr. Sprudzs will submit
a Working Paper and participate in
panel discussions at the Inter­
national Symposium on Documen­
tation of the United Nations and
Other Intergovernmental Organ­
izations, to be held August 21-23,
1972, in Geneva, Switzerland.
Franklin E. Zimring, Associate
Professor of Law and Associate
Director of the Center for Studies
in Criminal Justice, has been named
a full Professor of Law.
During the academic year 1972-
73 Mr. Zimring will be a Visiting
Professor of Law at the University
of Pennsylvania in the Fall Semester
and at Yale University in the
Spring Semester. He will be teach­
ing a course in Criminal Law at
both law schools.
Champagne Recepton in honor of the graduating Class of 1972.
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